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The Role of Air and Space Power and Control of the Air

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Unmanned Combat Air Systems in Future Warfare

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Abstract

In order to understand the possible future roles of UCAS it is necessary to recognise the role that both air and space power plays in modern warfare. Air power was seen as NATO’s most valuable asset by many during the Cold War. The British definition of air and space power, which is reflected in UK military Joint Doctrine publications, is, ‘The ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events.’1 Rightly, space is regarded as a crucial domain, in addition to land, sea and air. The latest definition of air power in Joint Doctrine Publication 0–30, UK Air and Space Doctrine is ‘using air capabilities to influence the behavior of actors and the course of events’.2

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Notes

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  1. Combat Air Solutions Ltd, UK

    Colin Wills (Director)

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© 2015 Colin Wills

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Wills, C. (2015). The Role of Air and Space Power and Control of the Air. In: Unmanned Combat Air Systems in Future Warfare. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137498496_5

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