Abstract
The question of knowledge about knowledge in the Charmides, the Republic, and in the treatment in the Apology of the ignorance of Socrates. The problem of Plato’s development. Dialectic and contradiction in the Sophist and the Parmenides as they relate to foundational thinking.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See Hans Sluga, Heideggers Nietzsche, in A Companion to Heidegger, eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 105.
See A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, Chapter III, Section II in Alfred North Whitehead: An Anthology, eds. F.S.C. Northrup and Mason W. Gross (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953), 604.
For the claim that there is such a contradiction, with division ultimately replacing dialectic, see W.G. Runciman, “Plato’s Parmenides” in Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, ed. R.E. Allen (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), 149–184.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2014 Scott Austin
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Austin, S. (2014). Plato and Followers. In: Tao and Trinity: Notes on Self-Reference and the Unity of Opposites in Philosophy. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137498144_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137498144_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-50557-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-49814-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)