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Abstract

Dialectic in the Presocratics and Neoplatonists in its relation to later Trinitarian thinking and to Nietzsche’s reflection on the problem of grounds. Comparison between the historical figures of Socrates and Jesus in relation to this problem.

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Notes

  1. See Austin, Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 13–22.

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  2. See Huang Po, The Zen Teaching of Huang Po: On the Transmission of Mind, trans. John Blofeld (London: Rider, 1958), 110.

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  3. Plotinus distinguishes among his three hypostases in terms of their different treatment of one and many (Plotinus, Plotinus: The Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna [London: Faber and Faber, 1962], V.1.4 372 and V.1.8 377).

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  4. See the description of the controversy in Anthony Mass, “Filioque,” in The New Catholic Encyclopedia Volume 5, eds. Bernard L. Marthaler, Richard E. McCarron, and Gregory F. LaNave (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 913–914.

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  5. When Hegel encounters the Heraclitean unity of opposites, he makes the connection with his own logic. See G.W.E Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy Volume 1, trans. R.F. Brown (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 75.

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  6. The indebtedness to Proclus is pointed out by John Dillon in the Preface to his edition of Proclus’s commentary on the Parmenides (Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s “Parmenides” trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), ix note 1.

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  7. See Stanley Rosen, Plato’s “Sophist”: The Drama of Original and Image (New Haven, CT: Yale, 1983), 44–45.

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  8. Reason and Spirit transcend Understanding, occupying a later place in G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller and J.N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977).

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  9. The Trinity is not reachable by natural reason (a dig at the Platonic/Augustinian tradition). See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book One: God, trans. Anton Charles Pegis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1975), Chapter 3, 63.

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  10. Thomas does not think that a distinction of respects in the Trinity would violate its unity: see St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book Pour: Salvation, trans. Charles J. O’Neil (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1975), Chapter 26, 143.

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  11. I take it that, in Stirner, the ego’s creative power extends even to itself. See John F. Welsh, Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 46–47.

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  12. See John Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1977), 2.

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  13. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by Walter Kaufman and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 160–161, Third Essay, Section 27

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  14. The Athanasian Creed involves the separation of the human and divine natures in Jesus. See Bernard L. Marthaler, Richard E. McCarron, and Gregory F. LaNave, eds., The New Catholic Encyclopedia Volume I (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 995–996.

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  15. This interpretation is taken by Paramahansa Yogananda in Autobiography of a Yogi (Los Angeles: Self-Realization Fellowship, 1998), 171n.

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  16. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), A669/B697

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  17. For antinomies as the beginning of dialectical method, see Michael Forster, “Hegel’s Dialectical Method,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (New York: Cambridge, 1993), 132.

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  18. See Malcolm Schofield, “The Antinomies of Plato’s ParmenidesClassical Quarterly 27 (1977): 139–158, for the possibility of an antinomic structure even well before the Parmenides itself.

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  19. Kant and the skeptics seem Socratic in their valuation of ethical pragmatism. For Kant it is only after pure reason fails that practical reason can succeed, and the purpose of skeptical paradoxes seems to be to defeat the urge for a purposeless and upsetting engagement with abstract theorizing (see Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in Philosophical Classics Volume 1 Ancient Philosophy 6th Edition, ed. Forrest E. Baird [Boston: Pearson, 2011], 544–545 Book I, Chapter 12).

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© 2014 Scott Austin

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Austin, S. (2014). The Greeks and Greek Issues. In: Tao and Trinity: Notes on Self-Reference and the Unity of Opposites in Philosophy. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137498144_3

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