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Abstract

Particular problems connected with the notion of a ground for appearance, if Being is taken to be all there is.

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Notes

  1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin, 1982), 481.

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  2. A.A. Long, “Parmenides on Thinking Being,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 12 (1996): 125–162. The interpretation is strongly and ably revived by Emése Mogyoródi in an unpublished paper entitled “Reason and Revelation in Parmenides,” delivered at the Second International Conference of the International Association for Presocratic Studies, University of Edinburgh, July 2010.

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  3. G.D. Phillips, “Parmenides on Thought and Being,” Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 546–560.

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  4. Patricia Curd, “Thought and Body in Parmenides,” in Parmenides, Venerable and Awesome: Proceedings of the International Symposium, ed. Néstor-Luis Cordero (Las Vegas, NV: Parmenides Publishing, 2011), 115–134.

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  5. Meister Eckhart, Sermon 23, in Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, trans. Raymond Blakney (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), 206.

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  6. “If someone were to point at one of the [sensible objects] and ask you, ‘What is it?,’ your safest answer by far, with respect to truth, would be to say ‘gold,’ but never ‘triangle’ or any of the other shapes that come to be in the gold, as though it is these, because they change even while you’re making the statement” (Plato, Timaeus, in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997], 1253 line 50B). This passage makes it clear that no particular copy of a form into the Receptacle lasts for more than an ephemeral moment.

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  7. See Friedrich Nietzsche, “Nietzsche Contra Wagner,” in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin, 1982), 683.

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  8. See Montgomery Furth, “Elements of Eleatic Ontology,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 7 (1968): 111–132.

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  9. Reprinted in The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A.P.D. Mourelatos (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974), 241–270.

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© 2014 Scott Austin

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Austin, S. (2014). The Being of Illusion. In: Tao and Trinity: Notes on Self-Reference and the Unity of Opposites in Philosophy. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137498144_2

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