The Shadow Banking System and the Need for Supervision

  • Valerio Lemma
Part of the Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions book series (SBFI)


In this chapter I will move from the link between the deregulation of the banking industry and the freedom to perform market-based financing, in order to understand the need for checks and balances in the shadow banking system.


Monetary Policy Credit Institution Supervisory Authority Euro Zone Regulatory Arbitrage 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Valerio Lemma 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Valerio Lemma
    • 1
  1. 1.Marconi University of RomeItaly

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