Shadow Banking Operations

  • Valerio Lemma
Part of the Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions book series (SBFI)


This chapter chiefly concerns the analysis of the shadow credit intermediation process, but the main purpose remains dealing with difficulties of the credit transformations, in order to understand the allocation of risks and benefits among the shadow banking entities.


Credit Risk Credit Rating Credit Default Swap Real Economy Credit Rating Agency 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Valerio Lemma 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Valerio Lemma
    • 1
  1. 1.Marconi University of RomeItaly

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