Abstract
This chapter provides a framework to understand government decisions on dispute settlement and WTO litigation in East Asia, a region where the executive branch has a history of promoting an export-led economy and continues to hold substantial power in trade affairs. It first explains state power in East Asia’s economic and trade policymaking and then how to assess state capacity in handling trade disputes and why this capacity is determined by government-business collaboration. Finally, this chapter lays out a framework to examine the extent of this collaboration based on a country’s export structure and policy networking system.
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© 2016 Jessica Chia-yueh Liao
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Liao, J.Cy. (2016). Developmental States Contesting Export Barriers in the WTO: An Analytical Framework. In: Developmental States and Business Activism. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137489562_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137489562_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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