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Introduction

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Developmental States and Business Activism

Part of the book series: International Political Economy Series ((IPES))

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Abstract

International trade policy has been shifting from diplomacy-based initiatives to law-based initiatives, as signified by the unprecedented creation and subsequent use of the dispute settlement mechanism in the World Trade Organization (WTO). While growing scholarship offers political explanations for this recent phenomenon, few have emphasized the state factor to explain why countries choose to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

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Notes

  1. The WTO dispute settlement system is not an enforcement body. The members have to rely on self-enforcement in complying with WTO rulings. However, it has been proven that nations take them into account more frequently when enacting, implementing, and interpreting domestic laws and regulations. See Paul B. Stephen, “American Hegemony and International Law: Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization”, Chicago Journal of International Law 1 (2000, spring): 49–74.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Monash University Malaysia, Malaysia

    Jessica Chia-yueh Liao (Residential Fellow)

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  1. Jessica Chia-yueh Liao
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© 2016 Jessica Chia-yueh Liao

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Liao, J.Cy. (2016). Introduction. In: Developmental States and Business Activism. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137489562_1

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