Introduction

Abstract

This book takes as its starting point a suggestion made by P. F. Strawson in Part II of Individuals (1959). There, Strawson is concerned with establishing a philosophical foundation for the subject–predicate distinction, which had come under attack (see, for example, Ramsay 1925) and, in doing so, to explicate the linguistic basis of the individuation of objects. In this connection (pp. 202ff.), he asks whether there are forms of language so basic that they lack predication altogether. According to Strawson, sentences of this kind should not contain any expressions that refer to, or presuppose, the existence of individuals, including sortal or characterizing universals. Strawson suggests “There is water here” as a candidate for this kind of sentence, which he calls a “feature-placing” sentence, because in using this sentence one merely “places” a “feature.”¹