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After the Cold War: END Thinking Remains Unchanged, 1990–Present

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Abstract

From the late 1980s, interest in nuclear strategy essentially died. The end of the Cold War did not fundamentally change Australian attitudes toward nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and US extended nuclear deterrence (END). Policy-makers in Canberra continued to attach a special importance to US END, but were not especially keen to venture too far into investigating the operational aspects of that security guarantee, also largely because there were no major threats to Australia. However, at the same time, policy-makers had to be increasingly careful about how Australia’s continued “reliance” on END would accord with a renewed push for, and policy statements about, arms control and nuclear disarmament.

Keywords

Nuclear Weapon Nuclear Disarmament Australian Defense Nuclear Deterrence Defense Planning 
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Notes

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© Christine M. Leah 2014

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