Abstract
Book 20 of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws opens with two of the most famous, and compelling, arguments in defense of commerce.1 In the first chapter of book 20, Montesquieu highlights the “good things” that have resulted from the spread of commerce and trade in the realm of mores:
Commerce cures destructive prejudices, and it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores.
Therefore, one should not be surprised if our mores are less fierce than they were formerly. Commerce has spread knowledge of the mores of all nations everywhere; they have been compared to each other, and good things have resulted from this.2
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Notes
Albert O. Hirschman. 1977. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 60.
Erik Gartzke. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1): 170. Michael Doyle. 2004. “Liberal Internationalism: Peace, War and Democracy.” Nobelprize.org. <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/themes/peace/doyle/index.html> points out that Montesquieu was one of the most important early proponents of the second doctrine. Montesquieu, Gartzke concludes, was the real source of Cobden’s conclusion that trade was a “grand panacea.” And he was the inspiration for Mill’s conclusion, in 1902, that commerce was in fact in the process of “rendering war obsolete.” Doyle gives Montesquieu credit for this argument, but he also denies to Montesquieu any level of sophistication or insight. He argues that Montesquieu focused too narrowly on a “single feature” of economic liberalism, that is, “trade.” Doyle also criticizes Montesquieu for failing to critically examine the arguments he was advancing in favor of a “liberal peace.”
A good example, although by no means representative, is Roger Boesche Boesche, Roger. 1990. “Fearing Monarchs and Merchants: Montesquieu’s Two Theories of Despotism.” The Western Political Quarterly 43 (4): 741.
For opposing examples, at the other extreme, compare Stephen J. Rosow. 1984. “Commerce, Power and Justice: Montesquieu on International Politics.” Review of Politics 46 (3): 346–366.
Peter T. Manicas. 1981. “Montesquieu and the Eighteenth-Century Vision of the State.” History of Political Thought 2 (2): 313–347.
See Paul Carrese. 2006. “The Machiavellian Spirit of Montesquieu’s Liberal Republic.” In Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy, ed. Paul A. Rahe, 121–142. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for an example of Montesquieu’s sophistication as a writer and thinker.
Carrithers has noted the lack of scholarship on Montesquieu’s economic thought as a whole; see David W. Carrithers. 2001. “Democratic and Aristocratic Republics.” In Montesquieu’s Science of Politics: Essays on the Spirit of Laws, eds. David W. Carrithers, Michael A. Mosher, and Paul A. Rahe. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 370. Since 1950, only a handful of studies have been devoted to it, including Nicos E. Devletoglou. 1963. “Montesquieu and the Wealth of Nations.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 29 (1);
Nicos E. Devletoglou. 1969. “The Economic Philosophy of Montesquieu.” Kyklos: Internationale Zeitschrift 22 (3): 530–541;
and André Garrigou-Lagrange. 1956. “Montesquieu et les Economists.” In Actes du congrès Montesquieu: réuni à Bordeaux du 23 au 26 mai 1955 pour commémorer le deuxième centenaire de la mort de Montesquieu, 279–284. Bordeaux: Delmas.; and Alain Cotta. 1957. “Le développement economique dans la pensée de Montesquieu.” Revue d’histoire économique et social 35 (4).
Some notable exceptions include Devletoglou, “Montesquieu and the Wealth of Nations”; Mark Hulliung. 1976. Montesquieu and the Old Regime. Berkeley: University of California Press;
Catherine Larrère. 2001. “Montesquieu on Economics and Commerce.” In Carrithers et al., Montesquieu’s Science of Politics;
Spector, Céline. 2004. Montesquieu: Pouvoirs, richesses et sociétés. Paris: PUF; Rahe, MLL;
and Paul Cheney. 2010. Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy. CambridgeMA: Harvard University Press.
For helpful overviews of this distinction, with general and overlapping interpretations, see Rosow, “Commerce, Power and Justice”; Larrère, “Montesquieu on Economics and Commerce,” Henry C. Clark. 2006. Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France. Lanham: Lexington, 117;
Randal R. Hendrickson, 2007. “Montesquieu and the Transformation of Republicanism.” PhD diss., Boston College 240; Rahe, MLL, 188–90; 228;
Thomas L. Pangle. 2010. The Theological Basis of Liberal Modernity in Montesquieu’s “Spirit of the Laws.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 100. It is possible, although speculative on my part, that Montesquieu found this distinction originally in Cicero. Coyer refers directly to the phrase, which he finds in Cicero, “the commerce of economy.”
See Henry C. Clark. 2003. Commerce, Culture, and Liberty: Readings on Capitalism before Adam Smith. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 420. We know that Montesquieu had read Cicero closely, and indeed, he refers to Cicero in the chapter in which this distinction is introduced (see XX.4).
Some commentators have noted that Marseilles is either a prototype for modern England (Carrithers et al., Montesquieu’s Science of Politics, 348– 349), or an awkward combination of republican virtue mixed with selfish commerce (Pangle, MPOL, 105–106). In either case, we can conclude that Marseilles is a problematic exemplar of a people who engage in economic commerce.
For a wonderful discussion of Montesquieu’s understanding of liberty, especially, the less well-known version of “philosophic liberty,” see Sharon R. Krause 2005. “Two Concepts of Liberty in Montesquieu.” Perspectives on Political Science 34 (2): 88–96.
Montesquieu is especially critical of Venice as a “model” because it is an immoderate aristocracy. See Rahe, MLL, 77. Compare David W. Carrithers. 1991. Not So Virtuous Republics: Montesquieu, Venice, and the Theory of Aristocratic Republicanism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 268 who initially gives a more flattering portrait of Venice, but eventually concludes, in agreement with Rahe, that Venice had become a “shorthand for tyranny.” See also PL #130 where Montesquieu implies that the economy is its “only resource.”
There is another reason lurking behind the wine example, which Montesquieu does not explore in any depth, although it could have been on his mind. In short, the whole idea of the international division of labor (see Lewinski, who criticizes Montesquieu on this point; Jan Lewinski. 1922. The Founders of Political Economy. London: Kind, 15).
Both Roger Caillois. 1949/1951. Œuvres complètes. Paris: Gallimard and Iain Stewart. 2002. “Montesquieu in England: His Notes on England, with Commentary and Translation.” Oxford University Comparative Law Forum (6) who has recently translated the notes on England, repeat the word “liberté ” although in the context, for parallel, the passage would make more immediate sense substituting the word “ égalité ” for liberty.
See D. Desserud. 1999. “Commerce and Political Participation in Montesquieu’s Letter to Domville.” History of European Ideas 25 (3): 135–151. for an extensive commentary on this letter.
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Bibby, A.S. (2016). Commerce in The Spirit of the Laws. In: Montesquieu’s Political Economy. Recovering Political Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137477224_3
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