Abstract
This chapter explains the core ideas of deterrence theory, specifically that it is largely associated with nuclear policy. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union adopted a survivable nuclear force to present a ‘credible’ deterrent that maintained the ‘uncertainty’ inherent in strategic stability as understood through the accepted theories of major theorists like Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Thomas Schelling. This chapter evaluates the limits and challenges associated with the application of deterrence theory to cyber warfare and argues that while there are major insights from deterrence theory for cyber warfare, there are also major problems introduced by the unique aspect of cyber technology that causes significant problems for deterrence. These are, first, uncertainty associated with awareness and attribution of an attack; and second, the uncertain effects of such an attack.
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Notes
Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Press, 1946); and Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959);
Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York: Avon Books, 1962); and
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).
David Yost, ‘Analyzing International Nuclear Order’, International Affairs 83/3 (May 2007), 549–574.
See Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
As Frances Gavin submits: ‘Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, from and what are we protecting these states? A large part of the US military commitment to Western Europe during the Cold War was motivated not only by the need to deter the Soviets but by a pressing need to keep the Federal Republic of Germany non-nuclear. Similar dual concerns — protection and restraint — motivated US security arrangements with Japan and South Korea. The benefits from a proliferation perspective, went beyond simply keeping the target state non-nuclear. If West Germany did not have nuclear weapons, Italy, Switzerland, and Sweden, for example, might be inclined to abstain. A non-nuclear Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea likely weakened proliferation pressures in Indonesia and Australia’. Francis J. Gavin, ‘Politics, History and the Ivory Tower-Policy Gap in the Nuclear Proliferation Debate’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (2012), 588–589.
For example, see, John F. Copper, ‘Island Grabbing in the East China Sea’, The National Interest (14 September 2012), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/understanding-the-south-china-sea-conflict-7453; and
Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘Armed Clash in the South China Sea’, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883.
John Pomfret, ‘U.S. Takes Tougher Tone with China’, The Washington Post (30 July 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html.
These motivations are explored in Bradley A. Thayer, ‘Humans, Not Angels: Doubting the Decline of War Thesis’, International Studies Review 15/3 (September 2013), 405–411.
Mark Schneider, ‘The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China’, National Institute of Public Policy (November 2007), http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/China%20nuclear%20final%20pub.pdf.
Jeffrey Larsen and Polly Holdorf, Strategic Stability at Low Numbers of Nuclear Weapons (Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, November 2010).
This argument was common in the Cold War and well expressed by Pierre Gallois, ‘NATO’s New Teeth’, Foreign Affairs 39/1 (1960), 73. Also see
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford UP, 1997).
Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, ‘Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenges’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2003), www.csbaonline.org/wp…/2003.05.20-Anti-Access-Area-Denial-A2-AD.pdf.
Larry Greenemeier, ‘Estonian “Cyber Riot” Was Planned, but Mastermind Still a Mystery’, Information Week (3 August 2007), http://www.informationweek.com/estonian-cyber-riot-was-planned-but-mast/201202784.
John Markoff, ‘Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks’, The New York Times (13 August 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?_r=0.
Gregg Keizer, ‘Georgian Cyberattacks Suggest Russian Involvement’, Computer World (17 October 2008), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9117439/Georgian_cyberattacks_suggest_Russian_involvement_say_researchers.
David E. Sanger and Steven Erlanger, ‘Suspicion Falls on Russia as “Snake” Cyberattacks Target Ukraine’s Government’. The New York Times (8 March 2014)
Francois Paget, ‘How Many Bot-Infected Machines on the Internet?’, McAffe Labs (29 January 2007), http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/how-many-bot-infected-machines-are-on-the-internet.
SRI International, ‘An Analysis of Conficker’s Logic and Rendezvous Points’ (19 March 2009), http://mtc.sri.com/Conficker/.
Bradley Graham, ‘U.S. Studies a New Threat: Cyber Attack’, The Washington Post (24 May 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/washtech/daily/may98/cyberattack052498.htm.
Marty Lyons, ‘Threat Assessment of Cyber Warfare: A White Paper’, Manuscript for University of Washington Homeland Security Course P590TU (7 December 2005) 17, http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/05au/whitepaper_turnin/Lyons-P590TU-White%20paper.pdf.
Susan Brenner, ‘At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 97/2 (Winter 2007), 379–475.
Peter Svensson, ‘What Makes Cyber Attacks So Hard to Trace?’, Brisbane Times (22 March 2013), http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/it-pro/security-it/what-makes-cyber-attacks-so-hard-to-trace-20130322-2gkfv.html.
Kim Zetter, ‘How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History’, Wired.com (11 July 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/.
Kelly Burton, ‘The Conficker Worm’, SANS (23 October 2008), http://www.sans.org/security-resources/malwarefaq/conficker-worm.php.
James Lewis, ‘The Korean Cyber Attacks and Their Implications for Cyber Conflict’, Center for Strategic and International Studies (23 October 2009), http://csis.org/publication/korean-cyber-attacks-and-their-implications-cyber-conflict.
John Markoff and Thom Shanker, ‘Halted ’03 Plan Illustrates U.S. Fear of Cyber Risk’, The New York Times (1 August 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/us/politics/02cyber.html.
For a discussion of the concept of tailored deterrence, see Barry R. Schneider and Patrick D. Ellis, eds., Tailored Deterrence: Influencing States and Groups of Concern (Maxwell AFB: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2011).
Jason Healey, ‘Commentary: Cyber Deterrence Is Working Dynamics Are Similar to the Cold War Nuclear Standoff’, DefenseNews (30 July 2014), http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140730/DEFFEAT05/307300017/Commentary-Cyber-Deterrence-Working?odyssey=nav%7Chead.
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© 2015 Brian M. Mazanec and Bradley A. Thayer
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Mazanec, B.M., Thayer, B.A. (2015). Deterrence Theory and the Challenge of Applying It to Cyber Warfare. In: Deterring Cyber Warfare: Bolstering Strategic Stability in Cyberspace. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137476180_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137476180_3
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