Abstract
If one seeks to elucidate the contemporary significance of the Rortyan notion of a poeticized culture, one cannot avoid a discussion of the American Renaissance. The question that interests me is how one can make the profound differences between Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Walt Whitman productive for a discussion of the relationship between pragmatism and Romanticism. We shall see in this chapter and the next that the foundationalist quest for certainty, which Emerson often vehemently rejects without being able to leave it completely behind, plays a crucial role in Thoreau’s thinking. It is this difference between the Thoreauvian and the Emersonian theoretical frameworks that adds an important dimension to our understanding of American Transcendentalism. While Emerson’s concept of truth is directly linked to terms such as transitoriness, volatility, inconsistency, and expediency, Thoreau, although he pluralizes the notion of truth, often demonstrates that a radical rejection of a foundationalist epistemology would be incompatible with the goals he pursues.1 Laying the foundations of his own thinking, the narrator of Walden warns against the danger of “illusory foundations” (1992: 65). In this chapter, I wish to illuminate the enormously fruitful tension in Thoreau’s texts between, on the one hand, his foundationalist epistemology and, on the other, his pluralization or pragmatization of the concept of truth.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
As far as the interpretation of Emerson as a precursor of pragmatism is concerned, see also Mark Bauerlein, The Pragmatic Mind: Explorations in the Psychology of Belief (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997);
Jonathan Levin, The Poetics of Transition: Emerson, Pragmatism, and American Literary Modernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999);
and Stanley Cavell, “What’s the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?,” Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 215–23.
Crucial in this context is the chapter “Solidarity” in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989: 189–98). Rorty’s notion of solidarity has been critiqued by numerous authors: see, for instance, Richard J. Bernstein, “Rorty’s Liberal Utopia,” The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 258–92;
Norman Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind: The Ungroundable Liberalism of Richard Rorty (New York: Verso, 1995);
Nancy Fraser, “Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty between Romanticism and Technocracy,” Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 303–21;
and Chantal Mouffe, “Deconstruction, Pragmatism, and the Politics of Democracy,” Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge, 1996), 1–12.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2015 Ulf Schulenberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Schulenberg, U. (2015). Books, Rocks, and Sentimental Education: Self-Culture and the Desire for the Really Real in Henry David Thoreau. In: Romanticism and Pragmatism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137474193_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137474193_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-50149-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-47419-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Literature CollectionLiterature, Cultural and Media Studies (R0)