Abstract
In the previous two chapters, it was argued that BIG provides a good means to ensure two social goods: peace and happiness. We anticipated a capitalist’s objection to this line of argument in chapter 4 , namely, that redistribution in the name of the social good is morally wrong. The argument was t hat capitalism itself requires reigning in of individual economic decisions in order to ensure the survival of capitalism itself. There is, however, still a powerful response open to the apologist for the sort of laissez-faire capitalist who wants to resist society’s taking happiness as an important desideratum for distribution:
Freedom is the highest social value. This was proven by Huxley in his novel Brave New World: it is a society that lacks freedom. The lives of the citizens of the Brave New World are carefully controlled by the political leaders of society. True, they are much happier than we are. However, no one in their right mind would trade our world for theirs. This shows that freedom is a much more important political value than happiness. Those who invite us to redistribute wealth and income in the name of happiness forget the terrible price of their proposal: freedom. Capitalism without redistribution in the name of the social good gives us the greatest freedom,1 while reining in capitalism in the name of happiness reduces freedom. This is a cost we should not pay.
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Notes
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I am not endorsing this line of thinking; I am merely reporting it. The idea t hat ow ning more propert y tha n others does not af fect one’s negative liberty has been challenged in a very compelling fashion by Gerald Cohen (Gerald Allan Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge Universit y Press, 1995)). We will make an argument against negative liberty below.
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© 2016 Mark Walker
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Walker, M. (2016). BIG Freedom. In: Free Money for All. Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137471338_7
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