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The Role of Civil Society in Combating the Misuse of Incapacitating Chemical Agents and Riot Control Agents

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Chemical Control

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Abstract

The previous chapters have explored the State-centric nexus of arms control and disarmament treaties and agreements, relevant international law and other regulatory regimes that are potentially applicable to ICA weapons, RCAs and related means of delivery. It is clear from such analysis that many of these instruments and regimes have ambiguities, weaknesses and limitations which the relevant Member States have been unable or unwilling to address. Furthermore, a number suffer from inadequate and patchy national implementation and a failure of States Parties and relevant regime organizations to challenge reported treaty violations by certain Member States.

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Notes

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Crowley, M. (2016). The Role of Civil Society in Combating the Misuse of Incapacitating Chemical Agents and Riot Control Agents. In: Chemical Control. Global Issues Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137467140_12

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