Abstract
The struggle between Israel and Hezbollah (the Party of God) between 1985 and 2000 was characterized by asymmetry: Israel was a regional superpower; Hezbollah could field five hundred fighters on the ground, backed by three thousand more on the home front. The power gap narrowed as Iran pumped massive technological and organizational aid into Southern Lebanon and Hezbollah applied increasingly sophisticated psychological warfare. During the decade and a half campaign, the Shiite organization combined guerilla activity with psywar and succeeded in creating a political climate suited to its interests: getting the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon and destroying the Israeli-supported South Lebanese Army (SLA). This was a textbook case of applied psychological warfare in a low-intensity war.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Esther Webman, “Anti-Semitism as a Corollary of Anti-Zionism: Basic Tenet of Hezbollah, Ideology,” Justice, No. 6 (August 1995): 17.
Mustafa Tlass, The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1988) [Hebrew].
Moshe Yegar, The History ofIsrael’s Foreign Hasbara Campaign (Tel Aviv: Lahav Publishers, 1996).
Copyright information
© 2014 Ron Schleifer
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Schleifer, R. (2014). The War between Israel and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon (1985–2000). In: Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137467034_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137467034_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-49995-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-46703-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Intern. Relations & Development CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)