Abstract
Terrorism with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is an urgent threat to homeland security. The process of counter-WMD terrorism often involves multiple government and terrorist group players, which is under-studied in the literature. In this paper, first we consider two subgames: a proliferation game between two terrorist groups or cells (where one handling the black market for profits proliferates to the other one to attack, and this is modelled as a terrorism supply chain) and a subsidization game between two governments (where one potential WMD victim government subsidizes the other host government, who can interfere with terrorist activities). Then we integrate these two subgames to study how the victim government can use the strategy of subsidization to induce the host government to disrupt the terrorism supply chain. To our knowledge, this is the first game-theoretic study for modelling and optimally disrupting a terrorism supply chain in a complex four-player scenario. We find that in the integrated game, when proliferation payment is high or low, the practical terrorist group will proliferate and not proliferate, respectively, regardless of government decisions. In contrast, in the subsidization subgame between the two governments, the decision of subsidization depends on its cost. When proliferation payment is medium, the decision of subsidization depends on not only its cost but also the preparation cost and the attacking cost. Findings from our results would assist in government policymaking.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Arce DG and Sandler T (2005). Counterterrorism — a game-theoretic analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(2): 183–200.
Arce DG and Sandler T (2010). Terrorist spectaculars: backlash attacks and the focus of intelligence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(2): 354–373.
Bier VM, Oliveros S and Samuelson L (2007). Choosing what to protect: strategic defensive allocation against an unknown attacker. Journal of Public Economic Theory 9(4): 563–587.
Brown G, Carlyle M, Salmeron J and Wood K (2006). Defending critical infrastructure. Interfaces 36(6): 530–544.
Brown G, Carlyle WM, Harney RC, Skroch EM and Wood RK (2009). Interdicting a nuclear-weapons project. Operations Research 57(4): 866–877.
Cormican KJ, Morton DP and Wood RK (1998). Stochastic network interdiction. Operations Research 46(2): 184–197.
Drakos K and Gofas A (2006). In search of the average transnational terrorist attack venue. Defence and Peace Economics 17(2): 73–93.
Enders W and Sandler T (2005). After 9/11 is it all different now? Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(2): 259–277.
Frey BS (2004). Dealing with Terrorism: Stick or Carrot? Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.: Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA.
Golden B (1978). A problem in network interdiction. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 25(4): 711–713.
Hausken K and Zhuang J (2011). The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics. Journal of the Operational Research Society 63(6): 726–735.
He F and Zhuang J (2012). Modelling ‘contracts’ between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game. Journal of the Operational Research Society 63(6): 790–809.
Hoffman B (2006). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press: New York, NY.
Konrad KA (2004). The investment problem in terrorism. Economica 71(283): 449–459.
Kunreuther H and Heal G (2003). Interdependent security. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26(2): 231–249.
Lapan HE and Sandler T (1993). Terrorism and signalling. European Journal of Political Economy 9(3): 383–397.
Levitin G and Hausken K (2009). Redundancy vs. protection vs. false targets for systems under attack. IEEE Transactions on Reliability 58(1): 58–68.
Major J (2002). Advanced techniques for modeling terrorism risk. Journal of Risk Finance 4(1): 15–24.
McCloud K and Osborne M (2001). WMD terrorism and Usama Bin Laden. http://cns.miis.edu/reports/binladen.htm, accessed December 2012.
Mickolus EF (2008). Terrorism, 2005–2007: A Chronology. Praeger Security International: Westpost, CT.
Pan F, Charlton WS and Morton DP (2003). A stochastic program for interdicting smuggled nuclear material. In: Woodruff DL (ed). Network Interdiction and Stochastic Integer Programming. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, pp 1–20.
Peters R (2001). When devils walk the earth: The mentality and roots of terrorism, and how to respond. The United States Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/ceto/when_devils_walk_the_earth.pdf, accessed December 2012.
Report to the President of the United States (2005). Commission on the intelligence capabilities of the United States regarding weapons of mass destruction. Final report. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/report/index.html, accessed December 2012.
Salama S and Hansell L (2005). Does intent equal capability? Al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction. The Nonproliferating Review 12(3): 615–653.
Sandler T and Arce DG (2003). Terrorism & game theory. Simulation & Gaming 34(3): 319–337.
Sandler T and Lapan HE (1988). The calculus of dissent—an analysis of terrorists’ choice of targets. Synthese 76(2): 245–261.
Sandler T and Siqueira K (2006). Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption. Canadian Journal of Economics 39(4): 1370–1387.
Sandler T and Siqueira K (2009). Games and terrorism: recent developments. Simulation & Gaming 40(2): 164–192.
Shan X and Zhuang J (2012). Cost of equity in homeland security resource allocations in the face of a strategic attacker. Risk Analysis. published online 19 December, doi: 10.1111/j.1539–6924.2012.01919.x.
Shan X and Zhuang J (2013). Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender-attacker game. European Journal of Operational Research 228(1): 262–272.
Washburn A and Wood K (1995). Two-person zero-sum games for network interdiction. Operations Research 43(2): 243–251.
Wein LM, Wilkins AH, Baveja M and Flynn SE (2006). Preventing the importation of illicit nuclear materials in shipping containers. Risk Analysis 26(5): 1377–1393.
Woo G (2002). Quantitative terrorism risk assessment. Journal of Risk Finance 4(1): 7–14.
Zhuang J and Bier VM (2007). Balancing terrorism and natural disasters—Defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort. Operations Research 55(5): 976–991.
Zhuang J, Bier VM and Ashish G (2007). Subsidies in inter-dependent security with heterogeneous discount rates. The Engineering Economist 52(1): 1–19.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2015 Operational Research Society
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Shan, X., Zhuang, J. (2015). Subsidizing to Disrupt a Terrorism Supply Chain—A Four-Player Game. In: Forder, R.A. (eds) OR, Defence and Security. The OR Essentials series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137454072_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137454072_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-49785-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-45407-2
eBook Packages: Palgrave Business & Management CollectionBusiness and Management (R0)