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Future Directions

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Abstract

This chapter discusses briefly some unresolved problems we anticipate will loom large in future corporate governance research. Firstly we ask is the UK an optimal, or even a desirable, size of democratic state on which to design a system of corporate governance? Here the EU “in/out” referendum slated for 2017 will resolve much uncertainty. Secondly we point to the role and rights of whistle-blowers in exposing and thus righting poor governance. Such actions often arise either from selfless actions or personal ambition/spite. We ask if a more systematic framework of whistle-blower enabling leglisation is now necessary. We also suggest the following may be fruitful areas for future research: the impact of a binding vote on executive pay; the success of calls for increased board diversity and the further evaluation of private equity buyouts and exits.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Institutional Investment Private Equity Cash Holding Legal Origin 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© William Forbes and Lynn Hodgkinson 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Loughborough UniversityUK
  2. 2.Bangor Business SchoolUK

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