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Institutional Investors

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Abstract

Institutional shareholders are increasingly the voice of equity capital and it is the threat of them exiting a company’s shareholder register that disciplines management in their control of the corporation. An active market for corporate control, institutionalized via meetings/discussions between fund managers analysts and the senior management team of the corporation subject the board of executives of the corporation to constant interrogation of the viability of their (shareholder) value addition strategy. Recently John Kay has criticized institutional shareholders for their short-term obsession with shareholder wealth at the expense of longer term, investment-led, corporate success.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Institutional Investor Pension Fund Fund Manager Discount Cash Flow 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© William Forbes and Lynn Hodgkinson 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Loughborough UniversityUK
  2. 2.Bangor Business SchoolUK

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