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Historical Context and Codification of Corporate Governance

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Abstract

The UK governance system privileges shareholder rights as residual claimants on the profits of the corporation. But law constrains these rights to produce what has been called an “enlightened shareholder” regime for corporate control. Yet it is the decline of owners’ rights in the face of a diffuse shareholder base precedes any active attempt by the UK to encourage an active market in equity claims. Indeed the current limited liability [corporate form] only emerged quite late in our history, after gaining a somewhat disreputable reputation in the industrial revolution. Limited liability implies that the rights of a corporation must always be more than the sum of its individual shareholders’ rights. So we might ask who is to be the beneficiary of these additional rights?

Keywords

Corporate Governance Limited Liability Corporate Control Governance Arrangement Governance Regime 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© William Forbes and Lynn Hodgkinson 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Loughborough UniversityUK
  2. 2.Bangor Business SchoolUK

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