Abstract
The UK governance system is often seen as part of the common-law/Anglo-Saxon governance regime we share with our former colonies and the US. While this form of governance is seen as particularly favorable to shareholders’ rights in controlling the corporation, much depends on how avidly and flexibly these rights are enforced. Nor is the governance regimes impact upon corporations truly separable from the structure of ownership and control it reflects or the extent of product market competition that a nation or industry faces.
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© 2015 William Forbes and Lynn Hodgkinson
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Forbes, W., Hodgkinson, L. (2015). Modes of Governance. In: Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom: Past, Present and Future. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137451743_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137451743_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, London
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