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Modes of Governance

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Abstract

The UK governance system is often seen as part of the common-law/Anglo-Saxon governance regime we share with our former colonies and the US. While this form of governance is seen as particularly favorable to shareholders’ rights in controlling the corporation, much depends on how avidly and flexibly these rights are enforced. Nor is the governance regimes impact upon corporations truly separable from the structure of ownership and control it reflects or the extent of product market competition that a nation or industry faces.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Governance System Investor Protection Legal Origin Product Market Competition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© William Forbes and Lynn Hodgkinson 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Loughborough UniversityUK
  2. 2.Bangor Business SchoolUK

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