The Helsinki Effect

Abstract

The Cold War highlighted the geostrategic value of Turkey and procured its inclusion in the post-World War II Western security conglomeration. This was enough for it to be seen as “European” when this was synonymous with “Western” and therefore eligible to, one day, join the EEC. Thus, the Turkish case was made by its geostrategic value and it is unlikely that the accession agreement would have been signed without it. However, thereafter, Turkey failed to make the crucial distinction between the evolving EU and NATO. Whilst one institution — NATO — was unconcerned by its normative failings, the EU came to base its core identity and even raison d’être on high standards of democracy and human rights, which Turkey did not live up to. This gave the opponents of Turkish EU accession, including Greece and Cyprus, plentiful reasons to keep it at arm’s length. So, a misunderstanding of the norms by Ankara coupled with a lack of reforms and the Cyprus issue meant Turkey continued to languish at the back of an ever-lengthening queue for accession — with little prospect of making any progress.