Introduction

Abstract

The title of this book, Humanity and the Enemy, intends to call into question one of Carl Schmitt’s most striking statements in The Concept of the Political. The statement in question is, “Humanity is not a political concept” (Schmitt 1996: 55). This statement is very central in Schmitt’s theory and has a twofold function: on the one hand, it is the result (and thus perhaps the proof) of his notion of politics as the relationship of friend and enemy, while being its very presupposition on the other hand. Indeed, the friend-and-enemy logic makes sense only insofar as humanity is excluded from the realm of politics, and this exclusion is both a presupposition and a result of the type of politics Schmitt has in mind. However, precisely, what kind of politics can it be that excludes humanity? Who are the actors in it, and what are its aims? A brief answer is that this is a politics that, in excluding humanity, also excludes ethics. Humanity would indeed be an ethical, rather than political, concept. However, this so-called autonomy of the political raises very serious issues. Notably, what will be the use of politics if politics is understood as being completely independent of ethics and any moral consideration? We know that for Aristotle, for instance, ethics is part of the political sciences.