The Bayesian Argument from Animal Pain

Abstract

We have been considering the nature of the datum that is the foundation of the problem of animal pain. The first chapter identified the problem as one of a potential failing in comparative confirmation relative to animal suffering. The second chapter defended the possibility and sensibleness of making the kinds of judgments necessary for that kind of problem to exist and clarified important features of the datum. Now that we have clarified our starting point adequately, we can discuss the path from there to the problem for theism. I will give the problem a probabilistic analysis. This chapter will cover three things. First, I will briefly describe the formal structure of the argument in Bayesian terms. Then I will consider, for each of the two components of the equation, what a plausible assessment of their values might be. The first step is of obvious importance. The second (two-part) step is important for situating the importance of the outcome of considering the problem of animal pain and situating it within a broader context in the philosophy of religion.