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Minds, Models and Milieux pp 91–109Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Boundedly Rational Decision-Making under Certainty and Uncertainty: Some Reflections on Herbert Simon

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Part of the book series: Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics ((AIEE))

Abstract

Our collective rationality became more bounded on February 9, 2001. Herbert Simon emphasized we humans are cognitively constrained, and those constraints impact our decisions. Yet, Herbert Simon’s mind was less constrained than most of our minds. Because of his exceptional thinking and writing, the constraints binding many disciplines have been relaxed. Consequently, those disciplines have become more rational, and less. The purpose of this chapter is to recognize how our collective rationality has been enhanced by the work of Herbert Simon, and related work, on decision-making.

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Authors
  1. Mark Pingle
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. San Diego State University, USA

    Roger Frantz (Professor of Economics) (Professor of Economics)

  2. The University of British Columbia, Canada

    Leslie Marsh (Senior Research Associate) (Senior Research Associate)

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© 2016 Mark Pingle

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Pingle, M. (2016). Boundedly Rational Decision-Making under Certainty and Uncertainty: Some Reflections on Herbert Simon. In: Frantz, R., Marsh, L. (eds) Minds, Models and Milieux. Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137442505_6

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