Abstract
For EU policymakers currently insisting on the moral economy of austerity in response to the banking and subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Southern Europe, the case of Greece suggests a particular lesson: Inadequate conditionality in social and subjective dimensions of political- economic life prior to membership (i.e. the alleged inefficiency of the Greek worker, corruption of the Greek official, and profligacy of the Greek consumer) breeds social disorder and economic contagion. That other explanations for the crisis are possible — in particular, that the introduction of the euro encouraged unsustainable lending practices and wage inflation in Southern Europe as Germany’s export markets surged (Krugman 2012) — is of little importance. The specter of an unconditionalized Greece seemingly makes the work of conditionality in the Republic of Macedonia and other candidate states in ‘the Balkans’ (a region long understood to be potentially dangerous) all the more vital.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2015 Joel T. Shelton
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Shelton, J.T. (2015). Assembling Conditionality in the Republic of Macedonia. In: Conditionality and the Ambitions of Governance. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137441607_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137441607_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-49526-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-44160-7
eBook Packages: Palgrave Intern. Relations & Development CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)