The Moral Argument for the Existence of God and Immortality: Natural Theology and Divine Revelation

Abstract

The previous chapter argued that Kierkegaard’s concept of the highest good is similar to that of Kant, since both conceive of the highest good not only as a moral world, but as a society of the virtuous and the happy that make up the human telos. Kant argues that we are obligated to promote (befördern) the highest good by being virtuous, although we are not capable of realizing it completely, since the highest good does not depend on our efforts alone.¹ If the highest good represents a purpose we are obliged to promote, this leads to the following problems. First, morality or virtue is undermined by our tendency (Hang) to evil. Beiser summarizes:

Kant does not think that human beings themselves are able to completely subdue radical evil, which constantly tempts them to except themselves from the moral law, even when it is contrary to their conscience. Although Kant does not think that grace is necessary for human beings to turn away from evil and towards the good, he still denies that they should have the confidence that they can ever redeem themselves before the sagacity of the moral law without grace.²