Original Sin and Radical Evil: Moral Freedom and Anxiety

Abstract

There has been a revival of the concept of evil and theories of evil since the 1990s.¹ Partially as a result of this, Kant’s doctrine of radical evil from Religion has been met with renewed interest and been attempted reconstructed, and defended.² Recently, many attempts have been made to show that rather than breaking with the early critical works, Religion and the doctrine of radical evil should be seen as a natural development of Kant’s critical philosophy. Religion explicates several notions that seem to be implicit in the earlier critical works (notably, the incorporation thesis, rigorism, the moral incentive, Wille, Willkür, and Gesinnung). Whereas the earlier works analyze the notion of a morally good will, Religion analyzes its conceptual counterpart; the notion of an evil will that appears to be a presupposition for imputation of immoral conduct.³