Abstract
The Prinkipo proposal had been an attempt to let diplomacy find a solution to Russia. But everyone and everything seemed to defy success. By February 1919, Prinkipo was dead; it just had not been buried. With its demise, the hope for a peaceful conclusion to the Russian civil war quickly faded. Each of the Allies went its own way in dealing with the Russian debacle, but all in the name of the Alliance. Never good at most times, coordination among the Allies seemed to disappear altogether as winter wore on. At first, though, it did not seem to matter. The White Russians appeared on the brink of success. During these early months, the Allied forces in Russia, along with the White Russians, attempted to push the Soviets back towards Moscow. However, the collapse of the Prinkipo initiative had disheartened the Allied leaders and they began to plan for the withdrawal of Allied military forces. The Americans and Canadians were both very vocal in their desire to get their soldiers out of harm’s way, while the political leadership in both France and Britain had various factions that, at the same time, advocated either increased military action or complete withdrawal. The chaos in politics, diplomacy and military operations continued apace, made more so by even poorer communications and inaccurate intelligence.
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Notes
Michael G. Fry, Lloyd George and Foreign Policy: Volume 1 The Education of a Statesman 1890–1916 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977), 23–4.
Markku Ruotsila, Churchill and Finland: A Study in Anticommunism and Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2005), 21, 24.
William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Visions of Glory, 1874–1932 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983), 680.
David Carlton, Churchill and the Soviet Union (Manchester University Press, 2000), 10.
John Silverlight, The Victors’ Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970), 202–3.
Bristol to Committee to Negotiate Peace, Telegram 171, Constantinople, 11 April 1919, and The Commission to Negotiate Peace to Polk, Telegram 1729, Paris, undated, received 22 April 1919, covering Jenkins to Commission to Negotiate Peace, telegram, Constantinople 19 April 1919 FRUS 1919, 758–9; Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, The Grinding Mill: Reminiscences of War and Revolution in Russia 1913–1920 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), 329–47.
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© 2015 Ian Campbell Douglas Moffat
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Moffat, I.C.D. (2015). Retreat, Abandonment and Bolshevik Victory, February–April 1919. In: The Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918–1920. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137435736_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137435736_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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