Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice pp 239–267Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Communications Frameworks and the Supply of Information in Policy Subsystems

  • Chapter

Part of the book series: Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy ((PEPP))

Abstract

In this chapter, we develop a new perspective on policy dynamics based on the generation and communication of information between the bureaucracy, Congress, and other relevant actors at the federal level in the United States. Our communications-based model of signaling emphasizes the importance of problem definition and the strategic manipulation of competition in the provision of information. In doing so, we draw a distinction between information supply in incentive-based systems versus competition-based systems. This distinction in the way information is supplied represents the emergence of a new paradigm for the study of policy dynamics with theoretical and practical importance.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Aberbach, J. D. (1990). Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, K. J. (1984). The Economics of Information. The Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow (Vol. 4). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F. R. (2014). Ideas and Policy Change. Governance, 26(2), 239–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F. R., Breunig, C., Green-Pedersen, C., Jones, B. D., Mortensen, P. B., Nuytemans, M., & Walgrave, S. (2009). Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective. American Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 603–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1991). Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems. The Journal of Politics, 53(4), 1044–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (2014). The Politics of Information: Problem Definition and the Course of Public Policy in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F. R., Jones, B. D., & MacLeod, M. C. (2000). The Evolution of Legislative Jurisdictions. The Journal of Politics, 62(2), 321–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F. R., & Leech, B. L. (1998). Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Burstein, P., & Hirsh, C. E. (2007). Interest Organizations, Information, and Policy Innovation in the U.S. Congress. Sociological Forum, 22(2), 174–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carlson, D. (2011). Trends and Innovations in Public Policy Analysis. Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 13–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, D. P. (1996). Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation. American Political Science Review, 90(2), 283–302.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, D. P. (2004). Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator. American Political Science Review, 98(4), 613–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dery, D. (1984). Problem Definition in Policy Analysis. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dodd, L. C., & Schott, R. L. (1979). Congress and the Administrative State. New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donnelly, P., & Hogan, J. (2012). Understanding Policy Change Using a Critical Junctures Theory in Comparative Context: The Cases of Ireland and Sweden. Policy Studies Journal, 40(2), 324–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, D., & O’Halloran, S. (1999). Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Esterling, K. M. (2004). The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, M. S., & March, J. G. (1981). Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol. Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 26(2), 171–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fiorina, M. P. (1977). Congress—Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gailmard, S., & Patty, J. W. (2012). Formal Models of Bureaucracy. Annual Review of Political Science, 15, 353–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gormley, W. T. (1998). Witnesses for the Revolution. American Politics Quarterly, 26(2), 174–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hilgartner, S., & Bosk, C. L. (1988). The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model. The American Journal of Sociology, 94(1), 53–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Howlett, M., & Ramesh, M. (2003). Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huber, J. D., & Shipan, C. R. (2002). Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Jenkins-Smith, H. (1988). Analytical Debates and Policy Learning: Analysis and Change in the Federal Bureaucracy. Policy Sciences, 21(1), 169–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jenkins-Smith, H. (1990). Democratic Politics and Policy Analysis. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jochim, A. E., & May, P. J. (2010). Beyond Subsystems: Policy Regimes and Governance. The Policy Studies Journal, 38(2), 303–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, B. D. (1994). Re-conceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, B. D. (2001). Politics and the Architecture of Choice. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2005). The Politics of Attention. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, B. D., Baumgartner, F. R., Brouard, S., Pedersen, C. G., & Walgrave, S. (Eds.) (2011). Special Issue on the Comparative Dynamics of Policy Change. Comparative Political Studies, 44(8).

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, B. D., Baumgartner, F. R., & True, J. L. (1998). Policy Punctuations: U.S. Budget Authority, 1947–1995. The Journal of Politics, 60(1), 1–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, B. D. (Ed.) (2012). Special Issue on Punctuated Equilibrium. The Policy Studies Journal, 40(1), 21–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, B. D., Baumgartner, F. R., Breunig, C., Wlezien, C., Soroka, S., Foucault, M., François, A., Green-Pedersen, C., John, P., Koski, C., Mortensen, P. B., Varone, F., & Walgrave, S. (2009). A General Empirical Law of Public Budgets: A Comparative Analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 53(4), 855–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, B. D. and Breunig, C. (2007). Noah and Joseph Effects in Government Budgets: Analyzing Long-Term Memory. Policy Studies Journal, 35(3), 329–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, M. D., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (2009). Trans-subsystem Dynamics: Policy Topography, Mass Opinion, and Policy Change. The Policy Studies Journal, 37(1), 37–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Katzmann, R. A. (1989). The American Legislative Process as a Signal. Journal of Public Policy, 9(3), 287–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kingdon, J. W. (1981). Congressmen’s Voting Decisions (2nd ed.). New York: Harper and Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koski, C. (2015). Does a Partnership Need Partners? Assessing Partnerships for Critical Infrastructure Protection. American Review of Public Administration, 45(3), 327–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krehbiel, K. (1992). Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • LaPira, T. M. (2014). Lobbying after 9/11: Policy Regime Emergence and Interest Group Mobilization. The Policy Studies Journal, 42(2), 226–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. E. (2003). Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lodge, M., & Matus, K. (2014). Science, Badgers, Politics: Advocacy Coalitions and Policy Change in Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain. The Policy Studies Journal, 42(3), 367–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowi, T. J. (1969). The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States. New York: W.W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • May, P. J., Jochim, A. E., & Pump, B. (2013). Political Limits to the Processing of Policy Problems. Politics and Governance, 1(2), 104–16.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • May, P. J., Jochim, A. E., & Sapotichne, J. (2011). Constructing Homeland Security: An Anemic Policy Regime. The Policy Studies Journal, 39(2), 285–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • May, P. J., & Koski, C. (2013). Addressing Public Risks: Extreme Events and Critical Infrastructures. Review of Policy Research, 30(2), 139–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • May, P. J., Sapotichne, J., & Workman, S. (2009a). Widespread Policy Disruption: Terrorism Public Risks, and Homeland Security. Policy Studies Journal, 37(2), 171–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • May, P. J., Sapotichne, J., & Workman, S. (2009b). Widespread Policy Disruption and Interest Mobilization. Policy Studies Journal, 37(4), 793–815.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • May, P. J., & Workman, S. (2009). The Paradox of Agency Issue Attention: The Bush Administration and Homeland Security. In C. Provost and P. Teske (Eds.), President George W. Bush’s Influence Over Bureaucracy and Policy: Extraordinary Times, Extraordinary Powers. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • May, P. J., Workman, S., & Jones, B. D. (2008). Organizing Attention: Responses of the Bureaucracy to Agenda Disruption. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 517–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCool, D. J. (1998). The Subsystem Family of Concepts: A Critique and a Proposal. Political Research Quarterly, 51(2), 551–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCubbins, M. D. (1985). The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure. American Journal of Political Science, 29(4), 721–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 3(2), 243–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, L. L. (2007). Rethinking Bureaucrats in the Policy Process: Criminal Justice Agents and the National Crime Agenda. The Policy Studies Journal, 32(4), 569–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitnick, B. M. (1975). The Theory of Agency: The Policing Paradox and Regulatory Behavior. Public Choice, 24(1), 27–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moe, T. M. (1985). Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB. American Political Science Review, 79(4), 1094–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nohrstedt, D., & Weible, C. M. (2010). The Logic of Policy Change after Crisis: Proximity and Subsystem Interaction. Risks, Hazards, and Crisis in Public Policy, 1(2), 1–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Patty, J. W. (2009). The Politics of Biased Information. The Journal of Politics, 71(2), 385–97.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosenbloom, D. H. (2001). Whose Bureaucracy Is This, Anyway? Congress’ 1946 Answer. PS: Political Science and Politics, 34(4), 773–7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shafran, J. S. (2014). A Whirlpool of Information: Information Processing in Policy Subsystems, 1995–2010. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Texas, Austin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, K. A. (1978). The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. American Political Science Review, 81(1), 86–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H. A. (1979). Models of Thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H. A. (1983). Reason in Human Affairs. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G. J. (1961). The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), 213–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G. J. (1971). The Economic Theory of Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thurber, J. (1996). Political Power and Policy Subsystems in American Politics. In B. G. Peters and Bert A. Rockman (Eds.), Agenda for Excellence: Administering the State. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weible, C. M. (2008). Expert-Based Information and Policy Subsystems: A Review and Synthesis. Policy Studies Journal, 36(4), 615–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weible, C. M., & Sabatier, P. A. (2009). Coalitions, Science, and Belief Change: Comparing Adversarial and Collaborative Policy Subsystems. Policy Studies Journal, 37(2), 195–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whitford, A. B. (2005). The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple Principals. The Journal of Politics, 67(1), 29–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williams, W. (1998). Honest Numbers and Democracy: Policy Analysis in the White House, Congress, and the Federal Agencies. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Workman, S. (2014). Congressional Bureaucracy and the Administrative Presidency: Policy Analysis as a Result of Institutional Conflict. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association. Seattle, WA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Workman, S. (2015). The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the U.S. Government: How Congress and Federal Agencies Process Information and Solve Problems. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Workman, S., Jones, B. D., & Jochim, A. E. (2009). Information Processing and Policy Dynamics. Policy Studies Journal, 37(1), 75–92.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yackee, S. W. (2006). Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16(1), 103–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yackee, S. W. (2012). The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-proposal Agenda Building and Blocking during Agency Rulemaking. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 22(2), 373–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Samuel Workman
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. JoBeth S. Shafran
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland

    John Hogan (Lecturer) (Lecturer)

  2. Simon Fraser University, Canada

    Michael Howlett (Professor) (Professor)

Copyright information

© 2015 Samuel Workman and JoBeth S. Shafran

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Workman, S., Shafran, J.S. (2015). Communications Frameworks and the Supply of Information in Policy Subsystems. In: Hogan, J., Howlett, M. (eds) Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice. Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137434043_12

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation