A Conjecture on Institutional Rationalities and Property Rights in Public Procurement of Innovation

  • Robert Ågren
  • Max Rolfstam
Part of the Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy book series (CICETP)


The increased interest in using public procurement as a policy tool for innovation has renewed a need for understanding the procurement process. A conjecture on institutional rationalities and property rights is offered to explain the hurdles present for conducting successful procurement projects. If an efficient negotiation solution is to be achieved, participants in procurement projects need to be aware of the other participants’ institutional rationalities and actively consider these while concluding the terms of procurement projects. Consequently, future policy efforts towards increased innovation have to be targeting the process of public procurement of innovation, rather than focusing on regulatory issues.


public procurement institutions property rights innovation bargaining games 


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Copyright information

© Servizio Italiano Publicazioni Internazionali 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Ågren
    • 1
  • Max Rolfstam
    • 2
  1. 1.Lund UniversitySweden
  2. 2.Aalborg UniversityDenmark

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