International Anti-Corruption Policies and the United States National Interest

  • Susan Rose-Ackerman
  • Sinéad Hunt
Part of the Political Corruption and Governance book series (PCG)


Statutes, treaties, and ‘soft-law’ initiatives seek to constrain bribery in international business transactions. Some claim that these anti-corruption instruments harm the United States national interest. Though hard statistics are unavailable, we argue that critics have overstated the negative impacts and neglected the potential benefits.


Foreign Direct Investment Supra Note Transparency International Foreign Corrupt Practice Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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  1. Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale University; Board Member Transparency International-USA. This article is a shortened and updated version of Susan Rose-Ackerman and Sinéad Hunt, Transparency and Business Advantage: The Impact of International Anti-Corruption Policies on the United States National Interest, 67; New York University Annual Survey Of American Law, 433 (2012); MA in International Relations, Yale University, 2009; Class of 2013 Yale Law School.Google Scholar
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© Susan Rose-Ackerman and Sinéad Hunt 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Susan Rose-Ackerman
  • Sinéad Hunt

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