Skip to main content

Introduction

  • Chapter

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

Macroeconomic debt crises have been a part of the economic scene ever since the emergence of modern credit markets. Sovereign defaults go further back in history.1 From time to time, a certain consensus has arisen among influential economists, policymakers and economic agents that crises are “a thing of the past,” at least in some countries which appear to have gained immunity for some reason or other. This complacency has been repeatedly disappointed — and was probably a major factor in its own disappointment: it is in the nature of those economic storms that they gather strength more easily when they are less expected (Kindleberger, 1978). Various economies, particularly but not only those labeled “emerging,” have experienced a considerable number of crises, especially in the last 30 years (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). The recent Great Recession in the world economy and the still open Euro Zone crisis have shown that highly developed central economies can also be vulnerable to debt-related macroeconomic disturbances of the first order of magnitude.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Aguiar, M. and Gopinath, G. (2007) “Emerging Market Business Cycles: the Cycle is the Trend,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 115, pp. 69–102.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2007) Understanding Financial Crises (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Auerbach, A. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2010) “Measuring the Output Responses of Fiscal Policy,” NBER Working Paper no. WP16311.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bagehot, W. (1873[1962]) Lombard Street: a Description of the Money Market (Homewood, IL: Richard Irwin).

    Google Scholar 

  • Barr, D., Bush, O. and Pienkowski, A. (2014) “GDP-Linked Bonds and Sovereign Default,” in Joseph E. Stiglitz and Daniel Heymann (eds), Life After Debt: The Origins and Resolutions of Debt Crisis, IEA Conference volume no. 152.

    Google Scholar 

  • Basu, K. and Stiglitz, J. (2014) “An Economic Theory Model to Amend the Treaty of Lisbon.” Available online at www.voxeu.org, January 2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Battiston, S., Delli Gatti, D., Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2007) “Credit Chains and Bankruptcy Propagation in Production Networks,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol 31, no. 6, pp. 2061–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Battiston, S, Delli Gatti, D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2012a) “Default Cascades: When Does Risk Diversification Increase Stability?,” Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 138–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Battiston, S., Delli Gatti, D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2012b) “Liaisons Dangereuses: Increasing Connectivity, Risk Sharing, and Systemic Risk,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 36, pp. 1121–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bordo, M., Eichengreen, B., Klingebiel, D. and Martinez Peria, M. (2001) “Is the Crisis Problem Becoming More Severe?,” Economic Policy, vol. 16, no. 32, pp. 51–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Borensztein, E. and U. Panizza (2008) “The Costs of Sovereign Default,” IMF Working Paper no. 08/238.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boz, E., Daude, C. and Durdu, C. (2008) “Emerging Market Business Cycles: Learning about the Trend,” FRB International Finance Discussion Paper 927.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brookings Institution (2013) “Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy,” Committee on Economic Policy and Reform, October.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brunnermeier, M. and Pedersen, L. (2009) “Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity,” Review of Financial Studies, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 2201–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cerra, V. and Saxena, S. (2008) “Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery,” American Economic Review, vol. 98, no. 1, pp. 439–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cruces, J. and Trebesch, C. (2011) “Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts,” CESifo Working Paper Series no. 3604.

    Google Scholar 

  • Delli Gatti, D., Gallegatti, M., Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2012) “Mobility Constraints, Productivity Trends and Extended Crises,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 83, pp. 375–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Grauwe, P. and Ji, Y. (2012) “Self-Fulfilling Crisis in the Eurozone: an Empirical Test,” Conference on the European Sovereign Crisis, Danmarks Nationalbank, April.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diaz Alejandro, C. (1985) “Goodbye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash,” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 19, nos 1–2, pp. 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Drelichman, M. and Voth, H.-J. (2013) “Risk Sharing with the Monarch: Contingent Debts and Excusable Defaults in the Reign of Philip II, 1556–1598,” Working Paper, University of British Columbia. Available online at http://www.economics.ubc.ca/files/2013/10/pdf_paper_mauricio-drelichman-risk-sharing-monarch.pdf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eaton, J. Gersovitz, M. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1986) “Pure Theory of Country Risk,” European Economic Review, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 481–513.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eggertsson, G. and Krugman, P. (2012) “Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 127, no. 3, pp. 1469–1513.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fisher, I. (1933): “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica, vol. 1, pp. 337–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Furman, J. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1998) “Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East Asia,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 2, pp. 1–114. (Presented at Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Washington, September 3, 1998.)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gai, P. and Kapadia, S. (2010) “Contagion in Financial Networks,” Bank of England Working Paper 383.

    Google Scholar 

  • Galiani, S., Heymann, D. and Tommasi, M. (2003) “Great Expectations and Hard Times: The Argentine Convertibility,” Economia, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 109–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B., Richiardi, M. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2008) “The Asymmetric Effect of Diffusion Processes: Risk Sharing and Contagion,” Global Economy Journal, vol. 8, no. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Geanakoplos, J. (2010) “The Leverage Cycle,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, vol. 24, pp. 1–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghosh, A., J. Kim., E. Mendoza, J. Ostrish and M. Qureshi (2011) “Fiscal Fatigue, Fiscal Space and Debt Sustainability in Advanced Economies,” NBER Working Paper no. 16782.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gorton, G. (2012) “Some Reflections on the Recent Financial Crisis,” NBER Working Paper 18397.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gorton, G. and G. Ordonez (2012) “Collateral Crises,” NBER Working Paper 17771.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1986) “Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 101, no. 2, pp. 229–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1993) “Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, no. 1, pp. 77–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2003) Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenspan, A. (1996) “The Challenges of Central Banking in a Democratic Society,” American Enterprise Institute, December 5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffith-Jones, S. and Hertova, D. (2012) “Growth-linked Securities,” in C. Bergsten and C. Henning (eds), Extraordinary Times: Essays in Honor of John Williamson (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics).

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffith-Jones, S. and Sharma, D. (2009) “GDP Indexed Bonds: Making it Happen,” Initiative Financing for Development, 79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guzman, M. (2013) “Overborrowing Crises and the Role of Expectations,” Working Paper Brown University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haldane, A. (2009) “Rethinking the Financial Network”, Speech delivered at the Financial Student Association. Available online at http://www.bis.org/review/r090505e.pdf?frames=0.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haldane, A. and May, R. (2011) “Systemic Risks in Banking Ecosystems,” Nature, no. 469 (January), pp. 351–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, S. and Bjorsted, E. (2012) “Heimdal: Model Description and Policies,” Economic Council of the Labour Movement.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heymann, D. (2007) “Developments and Alternatives: Perspectives on Macroeconomic Analysis,” in D. Heymann (ed.), Progresos en Macroeconomia (Buenos Aires: AAEP-Temas) (in Spanish).

    Google Scholar 

  • Heymann, D. (2008) “Macroeconomics of Broken Promises,” in R. Farmer (ed.), Macroeconomics in the Small and the Large. Essays on Microeconomics, Macroeconomic Applications and Economic History (London: Edward Elgar).

    Google Scholar 

  • Heymann, D., Kaufman, M. and Sanguinetti, P. (2001) “Learning about Trends: Spending and Credit Fluctuations in Open Economies,” in A. Leijonhufvud (ed.), Monetary Theory as a Basis for Monetary Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoff, K. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2010) “Equilibrium Fictions: A Cognitive Approach to Societal Rigidity,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 2, pp. 141–6.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hicks, J. (1967) Critical Essays in Monetary Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • IMF (2012a) “A Survey of Experiences with Emerging Market Sovereign Debt Restructuring,” Monetary and Capital Markets Department, June.

    Google Scholar 

  • IMF (2012b) World Economic Outlook, October.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jeanne, O. and Korinek, A. (2013) “Macroprudential Regulation vs. Mopping Up After the Fact,” NBER Working Paper no. 18675.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Jonung, L. (2009) “The Swedish Model for Resolving the Banking Crisis of 1991–1993:, Seven Reasons Why it Was Successful,” DG ECFIN, European Commission, Brussels.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaminsky, G. and Reinhart, C. (1999) “The Twin Crises: the Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems,” American Economic Review, vol. 89, no. 3, pp. 473–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keynes, J.M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Harcourt).

    Google Scholar 

  • Keynes, J.M. (1937) “The General Theory of Employment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 209–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kindleberger, C. (1978) Manias, Panics and Crashes (New York: John Wiley).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997) “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105, no. 2, pp. 211–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koo, R. (2003) Balance Sheet Recession: Japan´s Struggle with Uncharted Economics and its Global Implications (New Jersey: Wiley Publishing).

    Google Scholar 

  • Korinek, A. (2010) “Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality Effect,” Working Paper, University of Maryland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korinek, A. (2011) “Systemic Risk-Taking, Amplification Effects, Externalities and Policy Responses,” European Central Bank, Working Paper no. 1345.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krugman, P. (1979) “A Model of Balance of Payments Crises,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 311–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leijonhufvud, A. (1973) “Effective Demand Failures,” The Swedish Journal of Economics, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 27–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leijonhufvud, A. (2009) “Out of the Corridor: Keynes and the Crisis,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 741–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leijonhufvud, A. (2010) “A Modest Pr oposal.” Available online at www.voxeu.org, January 23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levy Yeyati, E. and Panizza, U. (2011) “The Elusive Costs of Sovereign Default,” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 94, no. 1, pp. 95–105.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marx, K. (1867, 1894) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vols. 1–3 (London).

    Google Scholar 

  • Minsky, H. (1975) John Maynard Keynes (New York: McGraw Hill).

    Google Scholar 

  • Mendoza, E. and Terrones, M. (2012) “An Anatomy of Credit Booms and Their Demise,” NBER Working Paper no. 18379.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, M. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1999) “Bankruptcy Protection Against Macroeconomic Shocks: the Case for a ‘Super Chapter 11’,” World Bank Conference on Capital Flows, Financial Crises, and Policies, April 15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, M. and Stiglitz, J.E. (2010) “Leverage and Asset Bubbles: Averting Armageddon with Chapter 11?,” Economic Journal, vol. 120, no. 544, pp. 500–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, M. and Zhang, L. (2014) “Saving the Euro: Self-Fulfilling Crisis and the ‘Draghi Put’,” in Joseph E. Stiglitz and Daniel Heymann (eds), Life After Debt: The Origins and Resolutions of Debt Crisis, IEA Conference volume no. 152.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mullainathan, S. (2002) “Thinking Through Categories,” Working Paper, Harvard.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nier, E., Yang, J., Yorulmazer, Y. and Alentorn, A. (2008) “Network Models and Financial Stability,” Bank of England Working Paper no. 346.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reinhart, C. and Sbrancia, B. (2011) “The Liquidation of Government Debt,” NBER Working Paper 16893.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K.S. (2011) This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandleris, G. (2012) “The Costs of Sovereign Default: Theory and Empirical Evidence,” Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Business School Working Paper 2012–02.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneider, B. (2014) “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Road Ahead,” in Joseph E. Stiglitz and Daniel Heymann (eds), Life After Debt: The Origins and Resolutions of Debt Crisis, IEA Conference volume no. 152.

    Google Scholar 

  • Setser, B. (2010) “The Political Economy of the SDRM,” in B. Herman, J.A. Ocampo and S. Spiegel (eds), Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Shiller, R. (2000) Irrational Exuberance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Shin, H (2010) Risk and Liquidity (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Schularick, M. and A. Taylor (2012) “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises 1870–2008,” American Economic Review, vol. 102, pp. 1029–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. (1972) “Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Take-Overs,” Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 458–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J (2000) “Some Elementary Principles of Bankruptcy,” in Governance, Equity and Global Markets: Proceedings f rom the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe, June 1999 (Paris: Conseil d’Analyse economique), pp. 605–20.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J (2001) “Bankruptcy Laws: Basic Economic Principles,” in S. Claessens, S. Djankov, and A. Mody (eds), Resolution of Financial Distress: An International Perspective on the Design of Bankruptcy Laws (Washington, DC: World Bank), pp. 1–23.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton)

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. (2010a) “Sovereign Debt: Notes on Theoretical Frameworks and Policy Analyses,” in B. Herman, J.A. Ocampo and S. Spiegel (eds), Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. (2010b) Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy (New York: W.W. Norton).

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. (2010c) “Contagion, Liberalization, and the Optimal Structure of Globalization,” Journal of Globalization and Development, vol. 1, no. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. (2010d) “Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial Integration May be Undesirable,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 2, pp. 388–92.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. (2011) “Rethinking Macroeconomics. What Failed and How to Repair It,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 591–645.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. (2013) “Pseudo-wealth and Macroeconomic Fluctuations,” paper presented to a meeting of INET Taskforce of Macro-economic externalities, Columbia University, May.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sturzenegger, F. and Zettelmeyer, J. (2007) Debt Defaults and Lessons From a Decade of Crises (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Thornton, H. (1802 [1939]) An Enquiry Into the Nature and Effect of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 2014 International Economic Association

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Stiglitz, J.E., Heymann, D. (2014). Introduction. In: Stiglitz, J.E., Heymann, D. (eds) Life After Debt. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137411488_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics