Bush and the Use-of-Force

Abstract

Released in 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America — and the lesser-known National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction — defined the Bush administration’s strategic response to the events of 11 September 2001. In essence, the controversial documents made two significant declarations. First, “WMD — nuclear, biological, and chemical — in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the US.”¹ Second, “[o]ur enemies have openly declared that they are seeking WMDs… the US will not allow these efforts to succeed… as a matter of common sense and self defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.”² Taken together, these two assertions — that the most vital threat to the national security of the United States was the linkage of “radicalism and technology” and that such developments needed to be destroyed “before” they were “fully formed”³ — created the basis for what became known as the “Bush doctrine.” Created via an assortment of post-9/11 speeches, particularly at West Point in 2001 and the State of the Union speech in January 2002, and formalized with the release of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (hereinafter NSS 2002) of September 2002, the Bush doctrine came to dominate US international political discourse as political leaders, academic scholars, analysts and the general public debated the ramifications of this broad and contentious initiative.