Introduction

Abstract

State recourse to the use-of-force has long been considered the main threat to international peace and security. In extending back to the horrific human devastation and calamitous economic consequences of World War I, it is evident that there were some attempts to restrain the still-accepted right of states to use war in attaining their national interests. The Covenant of the League of Nations proscribed in broad terms the option to force and instituted several mechanisms, including “an arbitration, a judicial framework in the Permanent Court of International Justice, and elaborate disarmament processes as confidence-building measures.”¹ The focus on disarmament was enhanced by the League’s attempt to put “collective security” at the core of its powers. Of course, the League’s inability to ultimately prevent World War II engendered extensive questioning of both its rationale and the very notion that war could be mitigated through reliance on law and international norms. Many in the international community argued that this in itself was a dangerous approach, given the natural propensity of states to utilize force as the foundation of their self-defense. Conversely, others contended that the disaster was the result of the League being insufficiently resourced and supported, most notable in the absence of its erstwhile champion, the United States, as a member. This latter insight proved the inspiration for US President Roosevelt’s planning and President Truman’s execution of the post-World War II international order.²