Community, Person, and International Norms in Hezbollah’s Political Language: Comparing the 1985 Open Letter and the 2009 Political Document

  • Filippo Dionigi
Part of the Middle East Today book series (MIET)


The previous chapters have highlighted the impact of international norms on Hezbollah’s Islamist identity analyzing its interaction with international actors via process-tracing methodology. This chapter focuses on an analysis of the language of Hezbollah, in particular with regard to the kind of vocabulary used to refer to persons, sociopolitical groups and international norms. It carries out a comparison of the key terms between two fundamental documents for Hezbollah. The first is the 1985 Open Letter to the Downtrodden (OLD) which was already introduced before.1 The second is the Political Charter of Hezbollah (PCH)2, publicly announced by the Secretary General Nasrallah on Hezbollah’s satellite channel al-Manar in October 2009.3 These documents (which are of comparable length) have been chosen for their central importance in the overall discourse of Hezbollah. The first, as already seen, is the founding declaration of the movement, while the second is the main programmatic political document that has been released by Hezbollah in 2009.


International Norm Religious Community Previous Chapter Islamic State Collective Entity 
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© Filippo Dionigi 2014

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  • Filippo Dionigi

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