Noncombatant Immunity and Israel-Hezbollah Wars: The Case of the April Understanding

  • Filippo Dionigi
Part of the Middle East Today book series (MIET)


As seen, Hezbollah was born and has been constantly operating in a situation of international conflict. Inevitably, its activity became exposed to the normative international context that regulates these circumstances that is International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The following analysis considers one case in which the IHL principle of noncombatants immunity1 has shown a particular influence in regulating the behavior of Hezbollah as a political and military actor.


International Norm Security Zone Islamic Principle Palestine Liberation Organization Ceasefire Agreement 
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© Filippo Dionigi 2014

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