Abstract
Given the common-sense assumption that words possess distinctive meanings — e.g. that Jan’s word, ‘piès’, has the property of meaning DOG — we can reasonably address ourselves to the question of where such phenomena come from, how facts of this sort are to be explained.1 More specifically:
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To what, if anything, are meaning-properties, such as ‘w means DOG’, conceptually (a priori) analyzable?
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To what, if anything, are they empirically (a posteriori) reducible?
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Which causal processes, if any, are responsible for their exemplification?
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References
Boghossian, P. (1989) The Rule Following Considerations, Mind 98: 507–49.
Horwich, P. (1998a) Truth, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horwich, P. (1998b) Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horwich, P. (2005) Reflections on Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horwich, P. (2010) Truth-Meaning-Reality Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Horwich, P. (2013) Belief-Truth Norms. In T. Chan (ed.) The Aim of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Oxford: Blackwell.
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© 2014 Paul Horwich
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Horwich, P. (2014). Kripke’s Paradox of Meaning. In: Berg, J. (eds) Naming, Necessity, and More. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137400932_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137400932_9
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