Abstract
Twenty is two times ten. The length of a body of 20 centimeters is twice the length of a 10 centimeter body. But is the temperature of a body at 20 degrees centigrade two times the temperature of a body at 10 degrees centigrade? No, it is not. This is easy to see by converting the temperatures into Fahrenheit: 20 degrees centigrade is 68 degrees Fahrenheit; 10 degrees centigrade is 50 degrees Fahrenheit; and thus the first temperature is no longer two times the other. As these are the same two temperatures that are being measured, each time in a different scale, we conclude that there is just no fact of the matter in the temperature reality of one body’s temperature being x times the temperature of the other.1
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© 2014 Eli Dresner
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Dresner, E. (2014). Over-Assignment of Structure. In: Berg, J. (eds) Naming, Necessity, and More. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137400932_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137400932_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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