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Dummett on the Logical Basis of Metaphysics

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Dummett on Analytical Philosophy

Part of the book series: Philosophers in Depth ((PID))

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Abstract

This essay is an abridged and slightly adapted version of chapter 14 of my book The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (Moore, 2012).1 The purpose of these opening remarks, which are not part of the original chapter, is to provide some necessary background from the rest of the book.

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Authors
  1. A. W. Moore
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cape Town, South Africa

    Bernhard Weiss

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© 2015 A.W. Moore

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Moore, A.W. (2015). Dummett on the Logical Basis of Metaphysics. In: Weiss, B. (eds) Dummett on Analytical Philosophy. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137400703_2

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