Abstract
Most North Korean provocations have had four things in common: (1) they are intentionally initiated at moments when they have the likelihood of garnering the greatest attention on the regional and perhaps even the world stage; (2) they initially appear to be incidents that are relatively small, easily contained, and quickly “resolved;” (3) they involve continuously changing tactics and techniques; and (4) they deny responsibility for the event. The South Korean military and government have taken important measures to deter and defend against this rogue state behavior. North Korea’s tactics, techniques, and procedures indicate a successful violent provocation in the future.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Samuel S. Kim, “The Rivalry between the Two Koreas,” in Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson (Eds.) Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 158.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2014 Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bechtol, B.E. (2014). DPRK Provocations: Deterring the Cycle of Violence. In: North Korea and Regional Security in the Kim Jong-un Era: A New International Security Dilemma. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137400079_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137400079_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-48606-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-40007-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Intern. Relations & Development CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)