Abstract
Having resolved upon a policy of ‘no surrender’ in the months after the fall of France, the British Government was faced with the problem of how to continue the fight against Germany until, as the architect of the ‘no surrender’ policy intoned, ‘the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old’.1 The loss of the British Expeditionary Force removed the capacity for terrestrial military engagement in Europe, and the North African theatre, though strategically important, was at the time viewed as too peripheral to carry the full weight of Churchill’s favoured policy of striking at the heart of the enemy. Though embraced by some in Whitehall as a war-winning strategy, aerial bombing on a scale required to deliver the fabled ‘knockout blow’ to Germany was a relatively untested means of engagement and it did not take long for the Royal Air Force’s limitations to become apparent. Another means of continuing the fight was to harness one of Britain’s clear strengths in 1940 — the Royal Navy — to tighten the blockade that had first been imposed on Germany in September 1939 further. Unlike bombing, there was precedent enough for a blockade to be implemented at the outset of the conflict with a clear conscience and an expectation, albeit slender, of success.2
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Notes
Winston Churchill, Great War Speeches (London: Corgi, 1957), pp. 23–4.
Richard Overy, ‘Allied Bombing and the Destruction of German Cities’, in Roger Chickering, Stig Förster and Bernd Grenier (eds), A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 277–95 (287);
Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 150–2;
David Reynolds, ‘Churchill and the British Decision to Fight on: Right Policy, Wrong Reasons’, in Richard Langhorne (ed.), Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War: Essays in Honour of F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 147–67 (155–9).
Geoffrey Till, ‘Naval Blockades and Economic Warfare, Europe 1939–45’, in Bruce Allen Elleman and Sarah C. M Paine (eds), Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counterstrategies, 1805–2005 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 117–29 (117–19);
Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870–1970 (Montreal: McGill Press, 1984), pp. 191–4.
Quoted from Jock Colville, Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955 (London: Phoenix, 2005), p. 3. For details of the blockade system and its problems pre-summer 1940
see W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, 2 vols (London: HMSO, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 43–62 (124–32). For a contrary viewpoint
see Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane, 2006), pp. 332–3.
Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931–1945 (London: Frederick Muller, 1957), pp. 334, 353; Medlicott, Economic Blockade, vol. 1, pp. 415–63.
Meredith Hindsley, ‘Constructing Allied Humanitarian Policy’, Journal of Holocaust Education 9.2/3 (2000), pp. 77–93 (84–5).
The Declaration of London was rejected by the British and, consequently, was never ratified by any of its signatories. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 1907), Sect. 3, Article 43; Declaration Respecting Maritime Law (16 April 1856), point 4; Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War (26 February 1909); Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Naval blockade and Internal Law’, in Bruce Allen Elleman and Sarah C. M Paine (eds), Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counterstrategies, 1805–2005 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 10–22.
German permission for relief for civilian internees was given on 28 September 1939. British and French agreement came on 23 November. There were some differences in the treatment of POWs and civilian internees despite the agreement, particularly in rations and clothing, for which POWs were generally better supplied – Andr Durand, From Sarajevo to Hiroshima (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1984), pp. 444–7;
Berryl Oliver, The British Red Cross in Action (London: Faber, 1966), pp. 431–2; ACICR:BG 3 003/004 – Haccius to ICRC, 10 October 1939; TNA:FO 371/25158 – MEW to FO, 14 February 1940; TNA:FO 369/2568 – Warner to ICRC, 30 April 1940.
Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: Allen Lane, 2008), pp. 274–90;
Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food (London: Penguin, 2012), ch. 8;
Polymeris Voglis, ‘Surviving Hunger: Life in the Cities and the Countryside during the Occupation’, in Robert Gildea, Anette Warring and Olivier Wieviorka (eds), Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2006), pp. 16–41; for specific discussion of German requisitions in France see
Ian Ousby, Occupation: The Ordeal of France, 1940–1944 (London: Pimlico, 1999), pp. 118–26.
Bob Moore, ‘The Western Allies and Food Relief to the Occupied Netherlands, 1944–1945’, War and Society 10.2 (1992), pp. 91–118; Collingham, Taste of War , pp. 176–7.
Hindsley, ‘Constructing Allied Humanitarian Policy’, pp. 95–6; Jean Beaumont, ‘Starving for Democracy: Britain’s Blockade of and Relief for Occupied Europe, 1939–45’, War and Society 8.2 (1990), pp. 57–82 (77–8).
Caroline Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (London: Harper Collins, 1998), pp. 294, 373; TNA:FO 837/1219 — Odier to Dalton, 3 December 1940; TNA:FO 837/1220 — Stevenson to Stirling, 24 January 1941. TNA:FO 837/1221 — Burckhardt and de Rouge to Dalton, 7 March 1941; Beaumont, ‘Starving for Democracy’, p. 63.
Violetta Hiondou, ‘Famine in Occupied Greece: Causes and Consequences’, in Richard Clogg (ed.), Bearing Gifts to Greeks: Humanitarian Aid to Greece in the 1940s (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 14–33;
Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation 1941–44 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 23–37.
Durand, From Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp. 191–3; Daphne A. Reid and Patrick F. Gilbo, Beyond Conflict: The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1919–1994 (Geneva: IFRC, 1997), pp. 118–25.
Caroline Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (London: Harper Collins, 1998), p. 387;
Paul Stauffer, Sechs Furchtbare Jahre, auf den Spruen Carl J. Burckhardt durch den Zweiten Weltkrieg (Zurich: Nzz Verlag, 1998), p. 17.
Marie Mauzy, ‘Inter Arma Caritas: The Swedish Red Cross in Greece in the 1940s’, in Richard Clogg (ed.), Bearing Gifts to Greeks: Humanitarian Aid to Greece in the 1940s (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 97–112 (100–1); TNA:FO 837/1235 – MEW Minutes, 15 February 1942; TNA:FO 837/1235 – FO to Stockholm, 27 February 1942.
Beaumont, ‘Starving for Democracy’, p. 68. A similar view is presented by Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream, p. 394; Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece, p. 47; and Procopis Papastratis, British Policy towards Greece during the Second World War, 1941–44 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 116–17.
Durand, From Sarajevo to Hiroshima, pp. 476–7; TNA:FO 916/333 – ICRC Report on setting up of Foundation, 26 May 1942; Berne to FO, 7 July 1942; TNA:FO 837/1235 – FO to Cairo, 24 June 1942; David Miller, Mercy Ships: The Untold Story of Prisoner of War Exchanges in World War II (London: Continuum, 2008), pp. 81–2.
Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 108–9.
Ben Shepherd, ‘Becoming Planning Minded: The Theory and Practice of Relief, 1940–45’, Journal of Contemporary History 43 (2008), pp. 405–19 (409–10).
Jean-Claude Favez, The Red Cross and the Holocaust, eds and trans John Fletcher and Beryl Fletcher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 159–61;
Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932–1945, Band II (Wiesbaden: Löwit, 1973), p. 1790.
Favez, Holocaust, pp. 69–72; ICRC Report, vol. 3, pp. 335–6; Meier Wagner, The Righteous of Switzerland: Heroes of the Holocaust, ed. Andreas C. Fischer and Graham Buik (Hoboken: Ktav, 2001), pp. 218–20.
TNA:FO 916/613 – Minutes of Zollinger meeting with Drogheda, 16 June 1943. Bla Vago, ‘The Horthy Offer: A Missed Opportunity for the Jews in 1944’, in R. L. Braham (ed.), Contemporary Views on the Holocaust (Boston: Springer, 1983), pp. 23–45 (40).
See generally Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews, 1933–1948: British Immigration Policy and the Holocaust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Ronald W. Zweig, ‘Feeding the Camps: Allied Blockade Policy and the Relief of Concentration Camps in Germany, 1944–45’, Historical Journal 41.3 (1998), pp. 825–85 (830–2).
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© 2014 James Crossland
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Crossland, J. (2014). Civilians and Ships, 1940–3. In: Britain and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 1939–1945. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137399571_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137399571_6
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