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Protecting Power: How Western States Retain Their Dominant Voice in the World Bank’s Governance

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Rising Powers and Multilateral Institutions

Part of the book series: International Political Economy Series ((IPES))

Abstract

As has often been remarked, the world is currently experiencing the biggest shift in the location of economic activity in two centuries; roughly speaking, from West to East.1 While applauded by some, the shift is creating deep insecurity in the long-dominant Western states, prompting them to try to protect the power positions they attained as a result of their economic dominance in the decades after the Second World War. And it is also creating ambiguity in the rising states about their new role in inter-state organizations, wanting a larger voice, but also wary of new responsibilities.

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© 2015 Jakob Vestergaard and Robert H. Wade

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Vestergaard, J., Wade, R.H. (2015). Protecting Power: How Western States Retain Their Dominant Voice in the World Bank’s Governance. In: Lesage, D., Van de Graaf, T. (eds) Rising Powers and Multilateral Institutions. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137397607_10

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