Arguments from Best Explanation

Abstract

The first two chapters looked at two indirect arguments for a perceptual theory of emotions. Neither Brentano nor McDowell claims that emotions are perception-like states, but their analogies can easily be taken to support such a claim. Brentano wants to use his analogy to show that we gain knowledge about values via our emotions, which is a central tenet of perceptual theories of emotions. And McDowell wants to use his analogy to show that values are response-dependent, and it seems a comparatively small step from an ontologica1 response-dependence to an epistemo logical relation between a response and that which it constitutes. I argued that both analogies are flawed. Brentano’s analogy is intrinsically flawed, that is, it yields results that are different from, and more difficult than, the ones that Brentano thought it yielded, and McDowell’s analogy seems difficult to sustain when it comes to the crucial element of the conditions under which the relevant responses are appropriate.