Abstract
The second North Korean nuclear crisis cannot be separated from the first crisis, not only because of the conflict between North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear capability and an international demand for preventing such capability from surfacing again, but also because similar patterns from the past had re-appeared. First, the nuclear negotiations consumed an enormous amount of time before reaching a tangible outcome. Second, North Korea was committed to bilateral negotiation with the US, although it dropped its demand for one-on-one negotiations with the US.1 Third, a negative image of North Korea conditioned not only the other parties’ understanding of North Korea’s attitude, but also the preferred options. Fourth, North Korea led the multilateral negotiation in its favor by eliminating uncomfortable issues from the agenda while including other issues that concerned North Korea, and it succeeded in urging other parties to accept a “package solution” in which both sides defined actions to be undertaken simultaneously. Lastly, the hard-earned agreement became nullified at the implementation phases.
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Notes
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© 2014 Jina Kim
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Kim, J. (2014). Repetitive Patterns of the Crisis. In: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137386069_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137386069_7
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