Abstract
North Korea and the US agreed on an interim settlement in 1994, but the crisis reemerged in 2002. Some argued that North Korea secretly prepared an “exit strategy” in case it ended up in a disadvantaged situation.1 Others observed that North Korea prepared for the possibility that the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework would not be respected by the others.2 Those who are interested in the interplay among North Korean elites argue that the military, which seized power over the technocrats in the late 1990s, attempted to seek nuclear weapons capabilities.3 Many believe that North Korea intentionally sabotaged the nuclear talks in order to buy time to manufacture nuclear weapons by demanding unreasonably high compensation in exchange for concession to international demands of denuclearization. However, for North Korea, the Geneva Agreed Framework was a watershed that could bring about normalizing the relationship with the US on the ambassadorial level and mend its former discrediting within the international community.
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Notes
Victor D. Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (2002): 79–92;
Victor D. Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): 70–4.
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Chang Gordon, Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World (Westminster, MD: Random House, 2006), 29.
According to Alexander George, Clinton’s policy toward North Korea was coercive diplomacy—use the threat of force to persuade North Korea to “stop short of the goal” of nuclear activities underway. The Bush administration turned to hawkish engagement for the purpose of changing the nature of the North Korean regime. Given that regime change is a potential goal of coercive diplomacy, the Bush administration also pursued coercive diplomacy by forming a discourse of “regime change” and “regime transformation” and concentrating military force in the Pacific Ocean. Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd edn, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 13;
Alexander L. George, “Strategies for Crisis Management,” in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 384;
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Robert Puckett, The United States and Northeast Asia (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1993);
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Yongsun Ha, Nuclear Weapons in the Korean Peninsula and the World Order (Seoul: Nanam, 1991), 162;
William J. Perry, Review of United States Policy towards North Korea (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1999), accessed April 21, 2011, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/nkreview.html; Richard L. Armitage, “A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea,” Strategic Forum, no. 159 (March 1999): 4–5, 7–8;
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The 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework agreed on the “freeze” of North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. KEDO, Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 21, 1994, accessed February 21, 2007, http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf.
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© 2014 Jina Kim
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Kim, J. (2014). Context of the Second Nuclear Crisis. In: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137386069_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137386069_6
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