Counter-Terrorism and Proliferation at Sea

Abstract

Prior to 9/11, governments tended to be reactive when securing transportation networks, primarily aviation networks, against international terrorism. International transport organizations usually put prevention measures in place after a particular terrorist incident had occurred, such as infra-red devices or metal detectors, installed after the use of the suitcase bomb which exploded on Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland (Hoffman 1998:18; Price 2004: 330; Szyliowicz 2004: 356). The events of 11 September 2001 coupled with the strikes on the USS Cole and Limburg, as detailed in Chapter 4, revealed to American policy makers and analysts the vulnerability of the US military and global transport systems to terrorist attacks, compelling states to evolve a more robust response (Weeks 2003: 17; Szyliowicz 2004: 353). As a result, the United States played an instrumental role in developing international maritime law in order to bolster maritime security and trade both domestically and internationally in the wake of 9/11 (Rothwell and Klein 2010: 22–3; Scott 2010: 80–1, 89–90). Specifically, these efforts to transform international maritime security regulation have looked to strengthen US defences against terrorists carrying out an attack on US soil, either by transporting materials to be used in a terrorist attack by ship or by using a ship itself to perpetrate a terrorist strike.