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Abstract

Many of the conceptual confusions fundamental to modern cognitivist theory had already been identified and widely recognized before the ‘cognitive revolution’ of the 1960s. Yet, whenever such confusions are pointed out, they are either fleetingly acknowledged, only to be quickly forgotten, or, more usually, emphatically denied. And, as I have found to my own cost, cognitive psychologists become outraged if you suggest that they may even be dualists.

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© 2013 Alan Costall

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Costall, A. (2013). The Unconscious Theory in Modern Cognitivism. In: Racine, T.P., Slaney, K.L. (eds) A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137384287_17

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