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Part of the book series: New Security Challenges Series ((NSECH))

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Abstract

Two things came together after 9/11 which both play a major role in this book: Germany’s post-war history, and US and international policies in Afghanistan. In the more than forty years preceding the terrorist attacks, Germany’s security policy had witnessed an extraordinary evolution — starting as an almost demilitarized society after the Second World War, Germany eventually came to send its forces to bombard Serbia without a UN mandate.1

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Notes

  1. For a much more detailed discussion on this development, see C. Hilpert, Accidental Combatants: German Strategic Culture and the Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan (doctoral dissertation, Munich: University of the Federal Armed Force, 2012).

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© 2014 Carolin Hilpert

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Hilpert, C. (2014). Setting the Scene: The US War on Terrorism. In: Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security Policy. New Security Challenges Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137383792_3

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