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Is It Better to Love Better Things?

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Love and Its Objects

Abstract

Is it better to love better things? This question is ambiguous in multiple ways. There are at least three variables: (a) What kind of better do we have in mind? Prudential, moral, aesthetic, or some other kind of better, such as more meaningful? (b) What do we mean by love? Do we simply mean ‘liking,’ or are we asking about something more robust, such as care or romantic love? (c) What kinds of things are we talking about? Ideals, artifacts, places, pets, or people?

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Authors
  1. Aaron Smuts
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Fribourg, Switzerland

    Christian Maurer

  2. University of Hertfordshire, UK

    Tony Milligan

  3. University of Pardubice, Czech Republic

    Kamila Pacovská

Copyright information

© 2014 Aaron Smuts

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Smuts, A. (2014). Is It Better to Love Better Things?. In: Maurer, C., Milligan, T., Pacovská, K. (eds) Love and Its Objects. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137383310_7

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